Simulation Models of the Evolution of Cooperation

as Proofs of Logical Possibilities. 

How Useful Are They? by Arnold, Eckhart
 Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XV, 2013, 2, pp. 101- 138 
 
101 
 
Simulation Models of  the Evolution of  Cooperation as 
Proofs of  Logical Possibilities. How Useful Are They? 
 
 
Eckhart Arnold 
Heinrich-Heine-University of  Düsseldorf 
Institut für Philosophie 
Eckhart.Arnold@uni-duesseldorf.de 
 
 
   
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses critically what simulation models of  the evolution of  
cooperation can possibly prove by examining Axelrod’s “Evolution of  Cooperation” 
(1984) and the modeling tradition it has inspired. Hardly any of  the many 
simulation models of  the evolution of  cooperation in this tradition have been 
applicable empirically. Axelrod’s role model suggested a research design that 
seemingly allowed to draw general conclusions from simulation models even if  the 
mechanisms that drive the simulation could not be identified empirically. But this 
research design was fundamentally flawed, because it is not possible to draw general 
empirical conclusions from theoretical simulations. At best such simulations can 
claim to prove logical possibilities, i.e. they prove that certain phenomena are 
possible as the consequence of  the modeling assumptions built into the simulation, 
but not that they are possible or can be expected to occur in reality I suggest 
several requirements under which proofs of  logical possibilities can nevertheless be 
considered useful. Sadly, most Axelrod-style simulations do not meet these 
requirements. I contrast this with Schelling’s neighborhood segregation model, the 
core mechanism of  which can be retraced empirically. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
In this article I am going to discuss the question what simulation 
models of  the evolution of  cooperation can possibly prove. I am going 
to discuss the question mainly in a historical context of  models of  the 
reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma that have become tremendously popular 
in the aftermath of  Robert Axelrod’s “Evolution of  Cooperation” 
(1984). At the time of  their publication Axelrod’s simulation studies set 
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the role model for a new approach to studying the evolution of  
cooperation. Despite its popularity this approach has never really been 
able to bridge the gap between the simulation models and empirical 
research. Moreover, it soon became apparent that far less can be 
deduced from pure simulation models about how the evolution of  
cooperation actually takes place than Axelrod had hoped for. In the 
first part of  this article I am going to explain why this is the case and 
why the research design that Axelrod’s study suggests is flawed: 
Simulations of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma do not allow us to 
draw general conclusions about the evolution of  cooperation. At most 
they can prove logical possibilities that is, they can prove that certain 
phenomena are possible as the consequence of  the modeling 
assumptions built into the simulation. But this does neither entail that 
the same phenomena can be expected to occur in reality nor that they 
are in reality the consequences of  the same factors as those represented 
in the simulation model, if they occur in reality. It might even still be 
the case that the phenomena produced by the simulation are impossible 
in reality. Thus, simulations of  this kind can only prove logical 
possibilities, but not real possibilities. 
Instead of  speaking of  “logical possibilities” one could also speak of  
simulations that prove “theoretical possibilities” or “proof  of  concept”-
simulations. In the following, I use the terms “logical possibility”, 
“theoretical possibility” and “proof  of  concept” synonymously. 
However, I prefer to avoid the term “theoretical possibility”, because 
the wording suggests a deeper insight which – in my opinion – highly 
stylized simulation models do not confer. Notwithstanding the 
terminology the central question is how much, if  any, insight we have 
gained into a natural phenomenon if  we have been able to prove certain 
logical possibilities concerning this phenomenon. 
The second section of  this paper, therefore, is dedicated to the 
question under what circumstances the proof  of  logical possibilities via 
computer simulations may provide valuable insights. I describe three 
sets of  circumstances under which this may be the case:  
1. If  the logical possibility demonstrates something that in virtue 
of  our prior beliefs and background knowledge is highly surprising or 
totally unexpected to us, or which we would not even have considered 
possible at all. I call this the novel discovery condition. 
2. If  the logical possibility is a key element in a best explanation of  
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some phenomenon. This is the case, if  the explanation of  some 
phenomenon merely hinges on the question whether the phenomenon 
can be produced by a particular mechanism and if  this can be 
demonstrated by a simulation. This can be called the best explanation 
condition. 
3. If  the logical possibility is also a real possibility (the difference 
between logically possible and really possible will be explained later) 
that can at least in principle be identified in some particular empirical 
setting then, again, it is useful to know this possibility. I call this the 
real possibility condition. 
These three conditions are to be considered disjunctive, that is, it 
suffices if  one of  them is met to render a theoretical computer 
simulation epistemically valuable. For the last case, the real possibility 
condition, Schelling’s neighborhood segregation model (again, a well 
known example from the history social simulations) will be discussed as 
an example. It will be argued that the logical possibility of  
neighborhood segregation produced by the mechanism postulated by 
Schelling can be considered a real possibility, if  the causal connection it 
describes can be traced by appropriate empirical methods. However, 
even a real possibility may not be the actual cause of  some 
phenomenon, but it needs to be checked against other possible causes 
first. 
The article concludes with a brief  summary of  the most important 
points and conclusions from the previous sections. 
I would like to emphasize that I am aware that Axelrod’s approach 
is history and that today “Evolution of  Cooperation” is the heading for 
a much wider array of  research programs, many of  which certainly 
avoid the deficiencies of  their ancestral role model. But my point is not 
to criticize the ongoing research on the evolution of  cooperation. 
Instead my aim is to better understand the epistemological challenges 
of  justifying simulation studies that remain purely theoretical and 
prove no more than logical possibilities. Arguably, for this purpose the 
examination of  a well known historical example is better suited than 
meddling with current research. Despite the enormous popularity of  
Axelrod’s simulations, there seem to exist no instances in which 
Axelrod’s simulations have successfully been validated empirically. But 
without empirical validation these simulations can demonstrate 
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nothing more than merely logical possibilities.1 
The question would of  course not be interesting if  the deficiencies 
of  these historical models weren’t an issue any more at all. However, in 
many areas of  the computational social sciences and life sciences they 
still are an issue. For the field of  agent based modeling this has been 
highlighted in an article by Heath, Hill and Ciarello (2009), who 
criticize agent-based models for their lack of  empirical validation: 
 
It could be argued that validation is one of  the most important 
aspects of  model building because it is the only means that 
provides some evidence that a model can be used for a particular 
purpose. Without validation a model cannot be said to be 
representative of  anything real. However, 65% of  the surveyed 
articles were not completely validated. This is a practice that is 
not acceptable in other sciences and should no longer be 
acceptable in ABM [Agent-Based-Modeling] practice and in 
publications associated with ABM. (Section 4.11) 
 
While I strongly sympathize with their criticism of  empirically not 
validated agent-based models,  I do not intend to take the stance that 
all simulation models must be empirically validated or, what amounts 
to the same, that simulations that only prove logical possibilities are 
always useless. Rather, I treat this as one of  the philosophical questions 
to be pursued in this context. My conclusion is that under the 
conditions listed above purely theoretical simulations may be 
insightful. However, often none of  these conditions is met. I therefore 
agree with Heath, Hill and Ciarello in so far as I believe that there is an 
overabundance of  purely theoretical simulation models which are 
indeed not useful for any “particular purpose”. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 There are kinds of  computers simulations of  which one can with some measure of  
justification claim that they prove real possibilities even without direct empirical 
validation. But this requires that the modeling assumptions are highly realistic and 
that all (natural) laws governing the simulated phenomena are well known as, for 
example, in quantum chemistry. Arguably, in the social sciences these requirements 
are never met.  
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2.  Simulations of  the evolution of  cooperation: The mixed blessings of  
the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma model 
 
2.1.  The success story of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma model 
 
It is always dangerous to date the definite historical beginning of  some 
trend or idea or fashion, but one can safely say that the use of  
computer simulations for the study of  the evolution of  cooperation 
really took on with the publication of  Robert Axelrod’s book “The 
Evolution of  Cooperation” (1984). To be sure, the very concept of  
reciprocal altruism – which, without going into too much detail here, 
amounts more or less to the same as Axelrod’s concept of  cooperation – 
had been devised much earlier in an evolutionary biological context by 
Robert Trivers (1971). But Axelrod’s use of  the computer to explore 
the evolution of  cooperation was quite innovative. An annotated 
bibliography assembled by Axelrod himself  and Lisa D’Ambrosio 
(1994) ten years after the publication of  the book lists 209 titles. The 
research report by Hoffmann (2000) “Twenty Years on: The Evolution 
of  Cooperation Revisited” confirms the impression that Axelrod’s 
famous computer simulations of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
continued to be a success story. However, the just mentioned research 
report relates conspicuously little empirical research on the topic. In 
fact, only one title is explicitly mentioned (Milinski 1987), although it 
had, by the time Hoffmann’s report was written, already turned out 
not to be successful in confirming Axelrod’s simulation model (Milinski 
and Parker 1997; Dugatkin 1997). We will come back to this in more 
detail later. 
Axelrod’s model virtually spawned myriads of  similar simulation 
studies of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (an incomplete list can be 
found in Dugatkin 1997), often only changing a few details or adding 
parameters to the original setup. Whole books with simulation series’ 
of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Arnold 2008) or similar models 
(Schüßler 1997) had been written in that way. Why did Axelrod’s 
simulations find so many followers in the scientific community? I 
believe that the reasons were a mixture between the simplicity of  the 
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simulation method and the assumed power of  its research design. As to 
the simplicity: Nothing was easier than conducting research on the 
evolution of  cooperation. You write a computer program, analyze the 
results, draw some more or less careful conclusions from them and 
publish the results. A single person with the necessary programming 
skills could write an Axelrod-style simulation within a few weeks. No 
comparison to the painstaking process of  empirical research (as in 
Milinski 1987) or to the costs for conducting game-theoretical 
experiments. And what could be wrong with it? Hadn’t Axelrod 
demonstrated how powerful the method is? At least it seemed so. But in 
fact, there exist considerable flaws in Axelrod’s research design. 
 
2.2.  The deficiencies of  Axelrod’s research design 
 
The research design of  Axelrod’s “Evolution of  Cooperation” consists 
of  three basic steps.2 First, take a game theoretical model and run 
computer simulations on this model. Then, analyze the results carefully 
and try to explain why happened what happened. Doing so, general 
conclusions can be drawn from the simulation results. These general 
conclusions can potentially be used to explain phenomena that fall 
within the scope of  the model. Proceeding in this fashion Axelrod came 
to the following conclusions about what factors encourage cooperation: 
 The evolution of  cooperation depends crucially on repeated 
interaction. Only the “shadow of  the future”, i.e., each player’s 
expectations about the future behavior of  other players,  encourages 
players to cooperate. 
 Successful strategies have the following characteristics (Axelrod 
1984, chapter 6): 
1. they are friendly, i.e. they start with cooperative moves 
2. they are envy-free 
3. they punish defectors 
4. they are forgiving (after punishment is finished) 
 TIT FOR TAT has all of  these characteristics and is an 
extremely good strategy in the reiterated two persons prisoner’s 
                                                 
2
 For a description of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma model that Axelrod 
used, see the appendix. 
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dilemma. 
Unfortunately, for each of  these recommendations counterexamples 
can be constructed by only slightly changing the parameters of  the 
reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma or the initial strategy set or the setup of  
the game. For example, in contrast to the second characteristic 
mentioned above, Bernd Lahno has constructed a strategy ENVY that 
makes sure to defect at least as often as the opponent. ENVY is usually 
about as good as TIT FOR TAT, but more robust against random 
disturbances (Lahno 2000).3 Or, to take another example, being 
forgiving is not always advisable: In order to avoid the problem that the 
initial strategy set of  the simulation is more or less arbitrary, one can 
set a complexity limit and run the simulation with all strategies that 
fall within the given complexity limit. One way of  doing so is to use 
finite automata as strategies. Finite automata have a fixed finite 
number of  states they can be in. The state determines their action (i.e. 
cooperate or defect in the Reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma) in the current 
round. Whether and to which state an automaton changes in the next 
round depends on the present state of  the automaton in connection 
with the opponent’s action. If  one limits the number of  possible states 
to two, there are only 26 different automata, which makes it easy to 
simulate. In a setting where all possible 26 two-state automata form the 
initial strategy set, the strategy GRIM emerges as the evolutionary 
winner (Binmore 1994, 315; Arnold 2008, 216-218). But GRIM is the 
most unforgiving strategy possible, because it never stops punishing if  
the opponent has dared to defect but once. The example of  the two-
state automata also demonstrates that TIT FOR TAT is not always a 
great strategy. (And it is not clear what exactly it would mean to say 
that it is so most of  the time.) It is not even generally true that 
indefinite repetition of  interaction is necessary to encourage 
cooperation. Rudolf  Schüßler (1997, 61ff.; see also Arnold 2008, 285-
289 and the appendix of  this paper) has constructed a simulation where 
players can break up the interaction at will. The reason why this does 
not generally encourage a hit and run-tactic is that those that employ 
hit and run must find their partner in a pool of  strategies that is mostly 
                                                 
3
 For a software implementation of  Axelrod’s model that also contains the 
strategy ENVY by Bernd Lahno see Arnold (2004). 
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made up of  other hit and run-players, because the honest cooperators 
tend to keep up their relationships. Thus, enforced continuation of  
interaction is not a requirement, though, in a slightly different sense, 
the shadow of  the future still is. But this is nearly the only general 
conclusion of  Axelrod that remains intact. 
Even worse for Axelrod, Ken Binmore (1998, 293ff.) has pointed out 
that from the viewpoint of  mathematical game theory Axelrod’s result 
yielding TIT FOR TAT as the winner strategy is both a trivial and at 
the same time highly contingent consequence of  the well known folk 
theorem, which states that any payoff  within the positive payoff  region 
(in the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma the range between the mutual 
defection and mutual cooperation payoff) is an equilibrium. (Just 
imagine a pool of  strategies that punishes “grimly”, i.e. forever, all 
deviations from the path leading to the equilibrium payoff.) 
Now, if  the simulation results of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
model and the conclusions that can be drawn from them are contingent 
on very specific conditions of  the simulation setup like parameter 
values, initial strategy set, noise etc., then this means that before any 
empirical phenomena can be explained with the help of  conclusions 
drawn from the observation of  simulations of  the reiterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, one better ought to make sure that the setup of  the 
simulation really matches the empirical situation. This, unfortunately, 
seems to be close to impossible for the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
model. 
 
2.3.  The continuing lack of  empirical confirmation of  the model 
 
I have mentioned earlier that the research report by Hoffmann on the 
“Evolution of  Cooperation” merely quotes one example of  empirical 
research, which is Milinski’s (1987) study of  predator inspection by 
sticklebacks. This study has become a kind of  running gag of  the 
empirical confirmation of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma model of  
the evolution of  cooperation. Whenever an example for empirical 
research in the vicinity of  Axelrod’s model is needed, this study is 
quoted. For example, it reappears in Osborne’s “Introduction to Game 
Theory” (2003, 445). Unfortunately the study is not a good example for 
the explanatory power of  Axelrod’s model.  
It all started so well, though. Predator inspection is a kind of  
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behavior exposed by various species of  shoal fishes. When a predator 
comes close to the shoal it can often be observed that one or several of  
the shoal fishes moves towards the predator, though carefully avoiding 
to come to close. Usually, the distance up to which a pair of  shoal fishes 
approaches the predator is short than that for a single fish.  Milinski 
examined the hypotheses that if  a pair of  fishes approaches the 
predator they play a reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. He did so by 
simulating partner fishes with a mirror and he found that if  the 
simulated fish stays behind, the real fish will stop to advance as well. 
Because of  this as well as some other reasons Milinski (1987) drew the 
conclusion that there is indeed evidence that the inspecting fishes play 
a Reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and that they employ TITt-FOR-TAT 
or a similar strategy. However, the ensuing scientific debate (see 
Dugatkin 1997) called this result into question, because a fish might 
continue to advance towards the predator if  the partner keeps up 
simply because the risk of  being eaten is lower than when advancing 
alone and not as a reward for cooperation. After ten years of  debate 
among experts, Milinski and Parker (1997) come to the conclusion that 
the empirical data does not suffice to decide whether the exposed 
behavior is indeed cooperative (as Milinski’s earlier study assumed and 
tried to explain with Axelrod’s model) or not. But this also means that 
we cannot be sure that Axelrod’s model provides an adequate 
description at all. In fact, Milinski and Parker (1997) do not make any 
use of  Axelrod’s model any more.  
Generally, the problem with Axelrod’s model is that it is not very 
robust4 and would require exact measurements of  the payoff  
parameters before it can be applied empirically. Now, the big problem 
is: How can we measure the payoff  of  some kind of  altruistic behavior 
in the animal kingdom in terms of  reproductive success? It is probably 
beneficial for ape’s to groom each others backs to get rid of  the lice. 
But how can we measure quantitatively the increase in reproductive 
success an ape with a well-groomed back enjoys? The problem has so 
far not been solved. Unsurprisingly, Dugatkin finds hardly any 
examples in his survey on “Cooperation among Animals” (1997) where 
such quantitative measurements of  payoff  parameters have been 
                                                 
4 See the appendix, where this problem of  Axelrod’s model is described in more 
detail. 
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attempted, let alone been successful. The situation for Axelrod-style 
modeling in biology twenty years after Axelrod’s book had been 
published is nicely summarized by the biologist Peter Hammerstein:  
 
Why is there such a discrepancy between theory and facts? A 
look at the best known examples of  reciprocity shows that simple 
models of  repeated games do not properly reflect the natural 
circumstances under which evolution takes place. Most repeated 
animal interactions do not even correspond to repeated games. 
[…] Most certainly, if  we invested the same amount of  energy in 
the resolution of  all problems raised in this discourse, as we do in 
publishing of  toy models with limited applicability, we would be 
further along in our understanding of  cooperation. 
(Hammerstein, 2003, 83, 92) 
 
  So much for the animal kingdom. What about the social sciences, 
though? Again, it is hard to find empirical studies that make more than 
merely inspirational use of  Axelrod’s model. One very striking 
example, however, is Axelrod’s reinterpretation of  Tony Ashworth’s 
historical study on the Live and Let-Live that emerged and was 
sustained between enemy soldiers during the First World War on some 
stretches of  the Western front line (Axelrod, 1984, chapter 4; Ashworth 
1980). Before any model such as Axelrod’s can be applied to a specific 
historical situation a lot of  factual knowledge about this situation is 
required. This is what Ashworth’s historical study has to provide. But 
Ashworth does of  course not confine himself  to relating bare factual 
knowledge. He also gives an explanation for the Live and Let-Live 
System where soldiers avoided shooting to kill (as they had been 
ordered to do) in the hope that the enemy on the other side would 
behave likewise. His explanation identifies an intricate set of  causes 
encompassing the desire to survive the war, empathy with the soldiers 
on the other side of  the front line, esprit de corps among the soldiers, 
similar routines, e.g. similar breakfast times when no one would shoot 
anyway, initial causes such as Christmas truces and bad whether 
periods, and, most importantly, whether the troops where elite troops 
or not. 
How can Axelrod’s model account for this intricate set of  causes? 
The answer is: It cannot account for most of  these causes other than by 
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hiding them in its payoff  parameters. But while the existence of  the 
causes that Ashworth mentions can be concluded from the historical 
sources that Ashworth quotes, the payoff  parameters can only vaguely 
be guessed by plausible assumptions. Axelrod argues with some good 
reason that the situation the soldiers in the trenches were in is indeed a 
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma situation (but see Schüßler 1997, 33ff. or 
Batterman et al. 1998, 89, footnote 19). However, there is no way of  
determining the parameters of  the payoff  matrix precisely. Moreover, 
the outcome in reality does not match the conclusions drawn by 
Axelrod from his simulations very well. For in his simulations 
cooperation prevails. But in the trenches the Live and Let-Live system 
only prevailed in one third of  all cases (Ashworth 1980, 171ff.). 
Even worse, Ashworth found out that the most crucial factor for 
Live and Let-Live was the elite status of  the troops. On front sections 
where elite troops were deployed, Live and Let-Live would not take 
place. This fact can be brought in accordance with the model by 
assuming that elite troops have different payoff  parameters that 
express valuing soldier’s valor higher than life. But then we are merely 
making assumptions in order to make our model work. For we might as 
well guess without a model that elite soldiers won’t shirk their orders as 
we may guess that the elite soldier’s payoff  parameters are such that 
our model does not predict cooperation any more.  
So why use the model at all, if  it does not add any epistemic surplus 
to the standing historical explanation of  the phenomenon? Some might 
argue it is about the generalization that the model allows. However, if  
we lose the grip on the actual causes – as we do when they are hidden in 
the payoff  parameters of  some game theoretical model – then 
generalization is bought at the price of  such a loss of  information and 
explanatory power that it is hardly worthwhile any more (Arnold, 
2008, 174ff.). 
A possible objection to this criticism of  Axelrod with respect to two 
instances of  empirical studies on particular instances concerning 
reciprocal altruism, might be that this criticism confuses generalist 
with particularist explanations (Batterman et al. 1998, 84ff.). In 
evolutionary theory generalist explanations describe the evolutionary 
forces through which a certain phenotype like, for example, certain 
cooperative or non-cooperative behavioral traits are brought about. 
These evolutionary forces are also often called the ultimate causes of  the 
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trait in question (Mayr 1961). In contrast to that particularist 
explanations concern the particular mechanisms, or proximate causes, 
through which the trait is realized. For example, the proximate cause 
of  the stotting behavior (i.e. a very ostentatious way of  jumping into 
the air) of  the Thomson Gazelle is that the Thomson Gazelle wants to 
signal to predators that it is healthy and not worth pursuing (Dugatkin 
1997, 94f.). The ultimate cause however is that the behavioral trait is 
evolutionarily advantageous because it reduces the gazelle’s risk of  
being chased and eaten by the thus informed predator. Regarding 
particularist and generalist explanations (or proximate and ultimate 
causes for that matter), it is important to understand that both types 
of  explanation work hand in hand but operate on different levels of  
causation. This means both types of  explanation must be compatible 
with each other if  they concern the same phenomenon, but at the same 
time a generalist explanation cannot be blamed for not yielding the 
proximate causes of  a phenomenon and vice versa. However, to be 
explanations at all, both types of  explanations must be empirically 
testable. Thus, the distinction between generalist explanations and 
proximate explanations is not to be confused the with the distinction 
between purely theoretical models and empirically validated models, 
even though generalist explanations just like purely theoretical 
explanations tend to be more abstract than their respective 
counterpart. 
In the case of  the Live and Let Live in the First World War it would 
therefore not be fair criticism that Axelrod’s explanation does not 
capture the causes that Ashworth’s historical narrative describes, if  
Axelrod’s explanation was about the ultimate causes and Ashworth 
explanation about the proximate causes. However, what is at stake in 
this example as well as the example of  the predator inspection behavior 
is not ultimate or proximate causes but whether the model of  the 
suggested ultimate cause (evolutionary altruism as described by the 
reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma model) can be identified empirically. In 
both examples this remains highly doubtful.  
Thus, Axelrod’s research design does not only fail when drawing 
general conclusions from specific simulation results, but also when 
trying to apply these conclusions to empirical subject matters. Others 
who have more or less followed Axelrod’s research design (Schüßler 
1997; Skyrms 1996; Skyrms 2004; Arnold 2008) have most of  the time 
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been more careful about drawing general conclusions from their 
simulation results. However, hesitating to draw conclusions they end up 
with the opposite embarrassment, namely, explaining what their 
simulations are good for, if  no tenable empirical conclusions can be 
drawn from them. This question will concern us now. 
 
 
3.  What do models prove, if  they merely prove logical possibilities? 
 
We have seen that the research design of  Axelrod’s “Evolution of  
Cooperation” is flawed, because it is not possible to draw general 
empirical conclusions from theoretical simulations. If  the simulation 
model is highly stylized – as Axelrod’s model is – it is often not possible 
to relate the model to concrete empirical problems other than in a 
purely metaphorical form. So, what if  anything can highly stylized 
computer simulation models demonstrate? The answer is that they can 
demonstrate logical possibilities, or – as one could also say – theoretical 
possibilities.Thus, Axelrod’s simulations demonstrate that cooperative 
strategies can evolve under the competitive conditions of  the reiterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. What they do not demonstrate (without further 
empirical research) is that any of  the instances of  cooperative behavior 
that we find in nature is indeed the result of  the mechanism that 
produces cooperation in the model. Moreover, a computer model as such 
cannot even prove that the mechanism at work is possible in nature. For 
what is possible in a model may still be impossible in nature. There may 
be natural laws that forbid to happen in nature what is possible in the 
computer; the conditions required to make the mechanism of  the model 
work may nowhere be given in nature; or the same effect may, as a 
matter of  fact, be brought about by totally different causes in nature. 
Thus, when speaking of  simulation models as demonstrators of  logical 
possibilities it is important to understand that these logical possibilities 
are not necessarily real possibilities as well. 
One could also say that models demonstrate that certain concepts 
work or can be rendered conclusively within the sphere of  theoretical 
imagination. Borrowing a term from software engineering one could 
speak of  a simulation model as a “proof  of  concept”. Thus, Axelrod’s 
model proves the feasibility of  the concept of  reciprocal altruism. 
Again, this does not say anything about its feasibility in reality. It 
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merely demonstrates that we can describe such a mechanism without 
logical contradiction. 
Having understood what “proof  of  concept” or “proof  of  logical 
possibility” means and, more importantly, what it does not mean, the 
question still remains, under what circumstances a proof  of  logical 
possibilities is valuable in the sense of  providing us with important 
insights or adding anything of  relevance to our scientific knowledge. I 
believe that there are (at least) three different cases where the proof  of  
logical possibilities can indeed provide an important piece in the puzzle 
of  scientific research:  
1. Novel Discovery. When it reveals a phenomenon that was formerly 
unknown and unexpected or believed to be impossible. 
2. Best Explanation. When the explanation of  some phenomenon 
merely hinges on the proof  that a particular mechanism can produce a 
given result. This can become important in the context of  an inference 
to the best explanation. 
3. Real Possibility. If  the proven logical possibility is also a real 
possibility and if  the modeled mechanism can be identified empirically.  
Any one of  these conditions suffices to render a theoretical model 
epistemically useful. I am now going to describe the three cases in more 
detail and one by one. 
 
3.1.  Revealing surprising phenomena 
 
One of  the best known examples for surprising simulation results are 
the simulations that gave rise to chaos theory. In the early 1960ies the 
mathematician and meteorologist Edward Lorenz, while running long 
series of  calculations of  non-linear but deterministic systems on the 
computer, found out that even small deviations of  the initial conditions 
can lead to a totally different outcome (Lorenz 1963). The effect was 
later termed the Butterfly-effect, because, since the weather is a non-
linear system, it could be possible that a butterfly’s wing flap in 
Australia sets off  a hurrican in America. If  we assume that this 
phenomenon was unknown or, to put it more carefully, went largely 
unnoticed before, then its logical possibility as demonstrated by 
computer simulations provides a scientifically valuable insight. 
Another example, that will concern us further below is Thomas 
Schelling’s (1971) model of  neighborhood segregation. Schelling’s 
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model demonstrates that the macro phenomenon that in many 
American cities the neighborhoods are either inhabited by blacks or 
whites, but seldom by a mixed population of  blacks and whites, can be 
the result of  micro motives quite different from the intention to live in 
a strictly segregated neighborhood. As Schelling’s model shows, the 
effect is brought about already by a fairly mild preference not to live in 
an area that is strongly dominated by another ethnic group. If  more 
than 50% of  neighbors from another group are still acceptable then 
this means that people would in fact be willing to live in an integrated 
neighborhood. Nonetheless, such a preference already suffices to 
produce highly segregated neighborhoods in the model. Thus, the 
model shows among other things that one cannot conclude from an 
observed neighborhood segregation pattern that the population must 
be racist. That Schelling’s model can also be misleading if  not 
interpreted carefully will be discussed below. Prima facie, the possibility 
proof  of  Schelling’s model provides a valuable insight because it refutes 
an otherwise rather natural conclusion. 
On the contrary, the insights that Axelrod’s simulation model 
provides are far less surprising. That in the reiterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma cooperative strategies can prevail is, as has been mentioned 
earlier, a trivial consequence of  the folk theorem, which was already 
known in the 1950ies (Binmore 1998, 293ff.). Axelrod’s model can serve 
as a nice illustration for the concepts of  reciprocal altruism and 
evolutionary stability, but both of  these concepts had been detected 
and described before: Reciprocal altruism by Trivers (1971) and 
evolutionary stability by Maynard-Smith (1982). However, even if  
providing a good illustration of  the concept reciprocal altruism is 
undoubtedly a merit of  Axelrod’s model, the same excuse cannot 
justify the large number of  variants and follow-up simulations. 
 
3.2.  Inference to the best explanation 
 
Another possible justification for an otherwise purely theoretical proof  
of  concept simulation can be that it plays an important role in the 
context of  an inference to the best explanation. A classical example 
may help to demonstrate under what conditions a theoretical derivation 
can be justified as best explanation. Gregor Mendel’s (1866) 
experiments in plant hybridization are a very successful example of  an 
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inference to the best explanation. Mendel observed that if  plants of  the 
same kind but with different characteristics are matched, the 
characteristics will reappear in the offspring in certain typical 
numerical proportions. For example, Mendel crossed (pure) green and 
yellow peas and found that all descendants would be green, while in the 
following generation the yellow peas would reappear but be dominated 
in number by the green peas with a ratio of  3 to 1. Mendel found that 
the same holds for round and wrinkled peas. And he found that when 
both characteristics are combined in one experiment this yields a 
characteristic ratio of  9 (green and round) : 3 (green and wrinkled) : 3 
(yellow and round) : 1 (yellow and wrinkled). Thus, the task was set to 
explain the reappearance of  characteristics in the specific empirically 
determined numerical proportions in subsequent generations. 
Mendel offered an explanation by describing a mechanism of  genetic 
inheritance, where each characteristic (in this case form and color) is 
determined by a genotype that contains two alleles5 that determine the 
characteristic. If  it is assumed that one of  these alleles is dominant and 
the other recessive and if  it is furthermore assumed that in the case of  
the peas the allele for green dominates the allele for yellow and the 
allele for round dominates the allele for wrinkled then the observed 
ratios of  characteristics in the descendant plants can be deduced from 
this mechanism. The mechanism and the example case is simple enough 
to make those deductions with pen and paper. But had Mendel lived in 
our time he might have used a computer simulation. This does not 
make a difference here, because in either case, the proof  of  concept 
consists in demonstrating that a certain mechanism is capable of  
producing a given result.  
Now in Mendel’s time molecular genetics did not yet exist, and it 
was not possible to determine whether the alleles were really existing 
entities. The mechanism he devised was largely a theoretical 
construction (just as so many game theoretical or agent-based 
computer simulations today). So, why do we accept this an 
explanation? The main reason is, I believe, the following: There are no 
real alternatives. It is hard to imagine an alternative mechanism that is 
equally powerful with respect to producing the observed result and at 
                                                 
5 Mendel himself  did not use these terms. I am using the modern terms “genotype” 
and  “allele” here for the sake of  simplicity. 
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the same time equally simple and elegant as the genetic mechanism 
postulated by Mendel. Thus, we can say that Mendel’s demonstration 
that a certain ratio of  hereditary characteristics can be produced by 
the postulated mechanism constitutes a best explanation. 
The crucial requirement for accepting a theory or a model or a 
computer simulation as a best explanation for some phenomenon is 
that either there are no sensible alternatives or all possible alternative 
explanations can be excluded for good reasons. In the case of  Axelrod-
style computer simulations this is usually not the case. Given a certain 
pattern of  human or animal behavior, it is usually possible to construct 
many different game theoretical (or non game theoretical) models that 
yield this pattern, each of  which could be defended on plausible 
grounds. Often computer simulation models contain rich sets of  
adjustable parameters which makes it easy to accommodate them to 
different desired outcomes – though at the price of  the reduction of  
their explanatory power.  
I have mentioned earlier that Milinski’s (1987) attempted 
explanation of  predator inspection with Axelrod’s reiterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma model suffered – as the subsequent discussion revealed – from 
the fact that alternative explanations are still possible (see Milinski and 
Parker 1997). And in the case of  the Live and Let-Live system in the 
trenches of  the Western front of  World War I, we have, from the 
historical account, knowledge about causes of  this phenomenon which 
do not even appear in the model. Thus, notwithstanding the question 
whether the application of  Axelrod’s simulation model and its results 
to this empirical case study can be justified by some other story, it most 
certainly cannot be justified as a best explanation of  the Live and Let-
Live system. 
Summing it up and generalizing the above considerations, 
simulation models that merely prove logical possibilities can be justified 
in the context of  an inference to the best explanation only if  no 
alternative possible explanations exist or if  those that exist can be 
excluded for good reasons.  
As a side note, it is imaginable to explain some observed cooperative 
animal interaction6 (by inference to the best explanation) as the 
                                                 
6 I do not enter into the non-trivial question how we can conclude whether some 
observed pattern of  behavior is cooperative or egoistic. 
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expression of  reciprocal altruism if  the limited number of  alternative 
forms of  genetic altruism (kin selection based altruism and group 
selection based altruism) can safely be excluded. Still, it would be 
dangerous to conclude that any particular model of  reciprocal altruism, 
like the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, provides the best explanation.  
 
3.3.  Logical possibilities, real possibilities and identifiable causes 
 
If  a proof  of  concept simulation can be justified as a best explanation 
then it is not necessary that the existence of  the simulated mechanism 
can be proven empirically. However, this type of  justification is only 
possible if  different alternative mechanisms for the explanation of  the 
same phenomenon can be excluded. Where this is not possible, a proof  
of  a logical possibility might still be scientifically useful, if  it can be 
shown that it also constitutes a real possibility. Or, in other words, it is 
useful when the simulated mechanism can be retraced empirically. 
Because simulation models that prove logical possibilities are often 
highly stylized, this can be quite a challenge. Milinski’s (1987) attempt 
to identify the cooperative behavior described with Axelrod’s reiterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma model in the predator inspection behavior of  shoal 
fishes shows just how difficult this can be. In the vicinity of  Axelrod’s 
reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma model it is hard to find any example 
where this has been achieved. Arguably, this is due to its lack of  
robustness and its employment of  input parameters (payoff  utility 
values) that cannot be measured empirically. To illustrate the case 
where a proof  of  concept model can be justified because it models an 
empirically identifiable cause, I will therefore discuss the well-known 
neighborhood segregation model by Thomas Schelling (1971). 
Schelling’s (1971) model captures one of  many possible causes how 
neighborhoods in residential areas become segregated by some group 
characteristic, e.g. color of  skin, of  their inhabitants. In its simplest 
form the model consists of  a checkerboard landscape, each field of  
which is inhabited by either a green or a red agent or – as a 
comparatively rare case – left empty. Each agent has a lower limit with 
how many neighbors of  the same color the agent feels happy in its 
neighborhood. It should be observed that if  this limit is below 50% 
then this means that the agent would be perfectly happy with an 
integrated neighborhood. Agents that are unhappy move to the nearest 
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empty field where they can be happy. The most interesting results are 
revealed, if  the limit is set to a comparatively low level like 30%. For 
even though this means that the agents would be quite happy to live in 
an integrated environment or even an environment that is (up to a 
certain limit) dominated by the other group, they end up in segregated 
environments.7 
What does this result prove? And, more importantly, can we learn 
something from the model about reality outside the model? As to the 
first of  these questions, Schelling’s segregation model proves the logical 
possibility of  segregated neighborhoods to be the result of  individual 
choices which are based on preferences that are not at all unfavorable to 
integrated neighborhoods. But is this logical possibility also a real 
possibility? In other words: Is it possible not only under the artificial 
conditions of  the model but in the real world as well that choices of  
individual humans or families that do not oppose integrated 
neighborhoods lead to segregated neighborhoods because of  their 
having a limit concerning how few member of  the same group in the 
neighborhood are acceptable to them? 
I believe8 that it is legitimate to consider a logical possibility a real 
possibility if  a) the prerequisites of  the model, most notably the values 
of  its input parameters can be retraced empirically, and if  b) there is 
reason to believe  that any unrealistic assumptions the model makes do 
not significantly affect its outcome. 
Here I understand under prerequisites the initial conditions with 
which the model starts. These are, evidently, the values of  the input 
parameters, but also structural conditions such as, for example, that 
the situation is a reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, or that there are more 
or less segregated neighborhoods that consist of  individual households. 
In a more general sense, the prerequisites of  a model can be understood 
as those features of  a model on which it depends to which (empirical) 
scenarios a simulation model can be applied or, what amounts to the 
same, whether it can be applied to any particular given scenario.  
The assumptions of  a simulations model concern furthermore those 
                                                 
7 This can easily be verified with the segregation model from the NetLogo library 
(Wilensky 1997). 
8 It would lead too far to justify the following two criteria epistemologically, here, 
but I am convinced that intuitively they are plausible enough. 
ECKHART ARNOLD 
120 
 
features that determine the course of  the simulation and which can 
(though do not need to) describe hidden mechanisms. Schelling’s model, 
for example, contains assumptions concerning the mechanisms by 
which households decide to move and by which they select the new 
destination. Evolutionary simulations like Axelrod’s typically contain 
assumptions concerning the population dynamics. Mathematical 
simplifications and correction terms can also be counted among the 
assumptions found in simulation models. Roughly speaking, while it 
depends on the prerequisites whether a simulation model can be applied 
to a particular scenario, it depends on the assumptions whether its 
results can be trusted. The distinction between prerequisites and 
assumptions is not razor sharp, but it is helpful as a guidance to 
distinguish between those aspects of  a model that must be empirically 
tractable before a model can be considered a realistic model and those 
aspects where this requirement can be lessened without interfering with 
its being realistic or at least its potential to deliver empirically reliable 
results. 
 It seems that in the case of  Schelling’s model both points can be 
granted. Regarding a) it does not seem impossible to inquire the 
preferences regarding integrated neighborhoods with a survey. Of  
course, the results of  a survey are always imprecise to some degree. But 
luckily Schelling’s model is quite robust in this respect.9 Also, it is 
worth mentioning that the preferences to be inquired are not opaque 
utility values (as in Axelrod’s “Evolution of  Cooperation” model), but 
concern the least percentage of  families of  the same ethnic group that 
an individual requires in his or her immediate neighborhood for not 
wanting to move out.  
Concerning b) it is important that Schelling’s model is also robust, 
i.e. its results remain essentially the same, if  the basic setup of  the 
model is changed, for example, by using a different geometry than the 
checkerboard (Adinoyat 2007, 441). But if  this is the case then there is 
hope that the simplifying assumptions of  the model do not affect its 
power to capture reality. Behind this reasoning lies the idea of  
derivational robustness analysis (Kourikoski and Lethinen 2009) which 
can roughly be described as follows: If  unrealistic assumptions of  the 
                                                 
9 This can be verified by varying the similar-wanted parameter in NetLogo’s 
segregation model (Wilensky 1997).  
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model are changed in various ways, but the results remain essentially 
the same, then it (hopefully) will not make a difference if  the 
unrealistic assumptions were substituted by the real conditions. Clearly, 
this is a case of  non-demonstrative inference. But if  this is granted then 
we can assume the model to be realistic enough for its purpose if  it 
withstands derivational robustness analysis. 
If  this line of  reasoning is accepted then we are entitled to assume 
that the logical possibility that Schelling’s model proves is also a real 
possibility. This means, for example, that policy makers that want to 
set up a program to develop and sustain integrated neighborhoods 
would need to take this possibility into account. It is, however, very 
important to understand that even a real possibility is not 
automatically an actual cause that explains existing or emerging 
patterns of  neighborhood segregation. Schelling’s model does not 
require group members to be racist to bring about neighborhood 
segregation, but in an empirical case of  neighborhood segregation 
racism could still be the cause. 
Generally speaking, to make sure that an identified possibility is an 
actual cause, it is necessary to check it empirically against other 
possible causes, some of  which might be much stronger and, therefore, 
preempt the effect of  this particular possible cause. Also, it needs to be 
checked whether there are no other factors that block the possible cause 
described by Schelling’s model. Possible alternative causes include 
housing prices in connection with differences in average income levels 
between different groups. It has also been suggested that it is not so 
much the actual number of  neighbors with a different color of  skin 
that triggers the decision to move away, but the increase of  the number 
of  neighbors with a different color (Ellen 2000, 124-125). Finally, it 
might be the case that it is not a single cause but a network of  several 
causes that bring about neighborhood segregation. In this case the 
epistemological situation would be similar as in the case of  Axelrod’s 
attempt to relate the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma model to the Live 
and Let Live system of  World War I. However, in contrast to Axelrod’s 
model, Schelling’s model captures a factor that is empirically 
identifiable. Thus, Schelling’s model can become useful for explaining 
neighborhood segregation even if  it captures only one of  several causes 
that are at work. Axelrod’s model – because the cause it models is not 
really identifiable empirically – cannot add anything relevant to the 
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explanation of  Live and Let Live. 
Thus, proofs of  logical possibilities also provide scientifically 
valuable insights if  the logical possibilities are at the same time real 
possibilities and if  it can be determined empirically if  they represent 
actual causes or not. 
 
4.  Summary and conclusions  
 
In this paper I have discussed what simulation models of  the 
“Evolution of  Cooperation” can possibly prove about their subject 
matter. I have discussed the question in the historical context of  the 
tradition of  modeling initiated by Robert Axelrod. With respect to this 
tradition the result is quite sobering. The research design that Axelrod’s 
role model suggested is heavily flawed. And most of  the models created 
in the tradition of  Axelrod are not empirically applicable and therefore 
pretty much useless. This is not to say that a model is useless just 
because it is purely theoretical. But we must keep in mind that it is 
only under fairly restrictive conditions that a purely theoretical 
simulation can become useful. I have described three different sets of  
conditions under which this is the case. While I cannot claim that the 
list is complete, I am quite convinced that any complete list will still be 
very restrictive. 
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from this 
discussion is that modeling is not per se a useful scientific activity. 
Modelers need to be aware of  the contexts of  explanation of  empirical 
phenomena to which their models are meant to contribute. Otherwise 
there is a considerable danger that their models will not be useful at all. 
Most importantly they need to take into account the inevitable 
restrictions under which empirical research labors. For example, it is 
useless to construct simulation models that rely on input parameters 
that cannot be measured precisely enough for the model to yield robust 
results. 
I anticipate two objections against this conclusion:  1. Some 
simulation models only aim at deepening the theoretical understanding 
of  some phenomenon and are not constructed with the intention of  
contributing to any empirical explanation in the first place.  2. The 
problem I describe is mostly history and – if  at all – concerns only 
specific schools of  modeling, most notably Axelrod-style models of  the 
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reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma models. 
As to the first objection: The technical and intellectual level of  
social simulations is certainly not high enough to justify social 
simulations as a purely theoretical endeavor or l’art pour l’art. Also, one 
cannot seriously claim to have achieved a deepening of  theoretical 
understanding if  that deepening of  theoretical understanding does not 
pay off  in terms of  empirical explanatory success sooner or later. 
Therefore, if  the simulations cannot be validated empirically 
themselves, the least that is to be asked for is that they sooner or later 
become useful in the context of  empirical science, somehow. Detached 
from their empirical object, social simulations are merely more or less 
trivial programming exercises.  
As to the second objection. In this paper I have indeed only covered 
historical cases, but there is evidence that similar problems still exit. In 
the beginning of  the paper I have quoted Heath, Hill and Ciarello 
(2009) who complain about the lack of  empirical validation of  many 
agent-based simulations. Regarding the research on the evolution of  
cooperation in particular, a more recent survey by Guala (2012) on the 
topic of  weak or strong reciprocity allows to draw the conclusion that 
the problem has shifted. While the contemporary modeling on weak or 
strong reciprocity apparently links fairly well to the experimental 
empirical research, there is still a considerable gap between models, 
simulations and lab experiments on the one hand side and field research 
on the other hand side. Often it seems that field research is not even 
seriously taken into consideration as the following quotation from 
Guala (2012, 8) illustrates: 
According to Bowles and Gintis (2002, p. 128), for example, “studies 
of  contemporary hunter-gatherers and other evidence suggest that 
altruistic punishment may have been common in mobile foraging bands 
during the first 100,000 years or so of  the existence of  modern 
humans.” In support of  this claim, however, they cite a study (Boehm 
1999) that does not endorse a costly punishment account of  human 
sociality. Richerson and Boyd (2005, p. 219) write that “in small-scale 
societies, considerable ethnographic evidence suggests that moral 
norms are enforced by punishment.” Among their references, however, 
one finds only two ethnographic surveys, a laboratory experiment, and 
a study of  dominance that do not support the costly punishment story 
(cf. Richerson & Boyd 2005, p. 280, n. 60).  
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Most of  Richerson and Boyd’s (2005) case is, in fact, based on Fehr 
and Gächter’s (2000a; 2002) experiments. 
One can get the impression that the attitude of  disregard for 
empirical research that has been symptomatic for many simulation 
studies of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is carried onward in a 
different form in the contemporary model-oriented research on the 
evolution of  cooperation. Thus it is still important to be aware of  the 
limitations of  pure simulation studies. And it continues to be a 
challenge to find simulation research designs that allow to link 
simulation studies with empirical field research. 
 
 
5.  Appendix: Examples for the weaknesses of  Axelrod-inspired 
research designs 
 
5.1.  A brief  introduction to the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma model 
 
The model that Axelrod investigated in his “Evolution of  Cooperation” 
is the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Model in a tournament and an 
evolutionary (or, more precisely, population dynamical) setting. The 
reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma – as its name suggests – consists of  
repeated rounds of  the one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the one shot 
Prisoner’s Dilemma two players each have the choice to either cooperate 
with the other player or to defect. There are four different payoffs 
depending on the four possible combinations of  choices the players 
make. If  both players cooperate both get a reward payoff  which is 
represented by the parameter R (default value 3); if  both players defect 
they both get a punishment payoff  (parameter P with default value 1); 
if  one player defects while the other cooperates, the player who defects 
gets a temptation payoff, which is the highest possible payoff  in the 
game (parameter T with default value 5), while the player who 
cooperates receives the lowest possible payoff  called the sucker’s payoff 
(parameter S with default value 0). For the game to be a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma the inequality T > R > P > S must hold. In the reiterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma also 2R > T+S must hold. The dilemma consists in 
the fact that it would be best for both players to cooperate, but they 
both have an incentive to defect, because, no matter what choice the 
other player makes, defecting yields a higher payoff  than cooperating. 
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As a consequence, both players – if  they behave in a strictly rational 
fashion – end up with the punishment payoff  instead of  the reward 
payoff. (In technical terms: The Nash Equlibrium of  the game is not 
Pareto-optimal.) 
In the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma several rounds of  the game are 
played. (Axelrod used 200 repetitions. It is important that the exact 
number is unknown to the players to prevent endgame effects.) Since 
players can adjust their choice in the subsequent rounds to the previous 
choices of  the other player, they get the opportunity to either punish or 
reward the other player. This opens up a host of  strategic 
opportunities. The simplest strategies are either always cooperate 
(called DOVE) or always defect (HAWK). Other reasonable strategies 
are TIT FOR TAT that chooses cooperation in the first round and 
cooperates in the subsequent rounds whenever the other player has 
cooperated in the previous round, but defects when the other player has 
defected, or the strategy PAVLOV (win stay, loose shift).  
This game can be played by human agents in economic experiments. 
While it can be difficult to find out what the exact strategies are that 
humans use in an experiment, there is a large body of  experimental 
evidence that shows that humans frequently cooperate in reiterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma games as well as other, related games like the 
Dictator Game or various Public Goods games (see, for example, 
Andreoni and Miller (1993), Gintis (2000) or Clark and Sefton (2001)). 
In fact the level of  cooperation was so high that it was a challenge for 
economists to find explanations that would reconcile these results with 
economic theory (for example, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)). In 
a computer simulation like that of  Axelrod, however, the players are 
computer agents the choices of  which are determined by algorithms 
that represent their strategies. 
In the tournament setting every strategy from a set of  strategies 
plays the pairwise reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with every other 
strategy. The goal is not to beat as many opponents as possible (in this 
case HAWK would be the best strategy, because it cannot be beaten in 
a pairwise match) but to gain the highest average score over all 
matches. 
In the evolutionary setting each strategy gets a share of  a population 
of  players which breeds offspring according to the success of  the 
strategy in a tournament of  all players. Thus, if  a strategy is successful 
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its share of  the population increases. A sequence of  tournaments is 
played where each tournament resembles a new generation. The result 
of  an evolutionary simulation of  the reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
shown on figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Evolutionary Simulation of  the reiterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma 
 
It should be observed that the strategy TIT FOR TAT that ends up 
dominating the population is superseded by HAWK and PAVLOV 
during the first generational cycles. The reason is that HAWK and 
PAVLOV both exploit DOVE, which TIT FOR TAT doesn’t. Once 
DOVE drops out of  the population they do not enjoy this advantage 
over TIT FOR TAT any more.   
 
5.2.  The lack of  robustness of  Axelrod’s model 
 
One of  the main reasons why Axelrod’s simulation model of  the 
pairwise reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma fails to explain empirical 
instances of  cooperative behavior is its lack of  robustness. Without 
entering into the details of  robustness analysis (see Kourikoski, 
Lethinen, Marchionni 2010 for a thorough treatment) I will consider 
only two aspects of  robustness here: 1. In order to be robust with 
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respect to empirical validation, the input parameters must be 
measurable and the model must yield stable results within the 
measurement inaccuracies of  the input parameters. 2. Moderate 
changes of  the setup of  the model should yield similar results. 
Examining Axelrod’s repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma model under these 
aspects with the simulation software published by Arnold (2004), we 
find that: 
1. Axelrod’s model is not robust with respect to changes of  the input 
parameters. 
If  a population dynamical simulation of  the Strategies DOVE, 
GRIM, HAWK, JOSS, RANDOM, TAT FOR TIT, TIT FOR TAT is 
run with the payoff  parameters T,R,P,S = 5,3,1,0 then TIT FOR TAT 
leads the evolutionary race after 50 generations with a population share 
of  38 %, but if  the reward parameter is only slightly changed from R = 
3 to R = 3.5, then DOVE emerges as winner with a population share of  
38 %. The consequence of  this lack of  robustness is that before one can 
conclude from the model that it is better to retaliate for defections (TIT 
FOR TAT) than not to retaliate (DOVE) one would need to be able to 
measure the reward parameter R with sufficient accuracy to distinguish 
R = 3 from R = 3.5 in the actual application case of  the model. 
2. The results of  Axelrod’s model strongly depend on the strategy set. 
If  the strategies DOVE, GRIM, HAWK, JOSS, PAVLOV, 
RANDOM, TAT FOR TIT, TESTER, TIT FOR TAT, 
TRANQUILIZER10 play a tournament, then the population dynamics 
yields TIT FOR TAT as the winner with TESTER11 placing second. If  
then the single strategy DOWNING 0.912 is added, the image changes 
completely with HAWK coming out first and GRIM on the second 
place. Again, for any particular application case we would need to be 
                                                 
10 For a description of  theses strategies see Axelrod (1984) or, alternatively, the 
source code of  CoopSim (http://www.eckhartarnold.de/apppages/coopsim.html). 
11 TESTER defects in the first two rounds. If  the opponent reacts with 
punishment, TESTER plays a cooperative move (as consolation, if  you like) and 
then switches to playing TIT-FOR-TAT during the rest of  the game. Otherwise, 
TESTER defects every second round for the rest of  the game. 
12 DOWNING 0.9 tries to estimate the probability of  being punished. It 
cooperates if  this probability is greater than a certain value (0.9 by default), 
otherwise it deceives. (Note: This strategy is somewhat different from the strategy 
DOWNING described in Axelrod’s “Evolution of  Cooperation” (1984)). 
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able to determine the set of  strategies that are in the race. It should be 
noted in this context that the inference from observed behavioral 
patterns to strategies can be ambiguous. 
Because the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma model lacks the robustness 
that would make it applicable in an empirical context, I hold the 
opinion that it is not more than a good metaphor for reciprocal 
altruism in nature or society. One can, of  course, also put it positively 
and say that the model provides a metaphorical explanation of  
reciprocal altruism – no more, no less. 
 
5.3.  Schüßler’s model of  cooperation on anonymous markets 
 
One of  the more interesting follow-ups to Axelrod’s model has been 
developed by Rudolf  Schüßler (1997). Schüßler’s approach resembles 
Axelrod’s model and research design in so far as he uses a highly 
stylized game theoretical model and draws conclusions with respect to a 
much more general debate.  
The most important deviation from Axelrod’s model is that 
Schüßler’s model allows the players to exit the reiterated game, thus 
encouraging a hit- and run technique. A stripped down variant of  
Schüßler’s simulation model13 works as follows: There are just two 
strategies in the game: HAWK and QUIT FOR TAT. HAWK always 
defects and quits the interaction when the other player starts 
retaliating. QUIT FOR TAT cooperates but quits the interaction after 
the first defection of  the other player. Interactions can also be ended by 
a random chance event. If  an interaction sequence has ended, the 
players need to seek a partner from the pool of  free players. After a 
certain number of  rounds a new generation starts and each strategy’s 
share of  the population is updated according to its average payoff. 
The result (figure 2) is that even though HAWK can employ a hit 
and run tactic (that has diligently been made impossible in Axelrod’s 
original model) the cooperative QUIT FOR TAT strategy is more 
successful and soon dominates the population at a stable equilibrium 
with a high number of  QUIT FOR TAT players and a low number of  
HAWK players. 
                                                 
13 The source code can be downloaded from: 
http://www.eckhartarnold.de/apppages/downloads/RPD_with_exit_option.zip 
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Figure 2: A simplified version of  Schüßler’s (1997) simulation that 
allows players to end the interaction at will 
 
The explanation for this phenomenon is simple: Since the 
cooperative QUIT FOR TAT players tend to keep up the interaction 
with other cooperative players, the pool of  free players will mostly 
consist of  non-cooperative HAWK players. This effectively ruins the 
bargain for HAWK players, because most of  the time they are on the 
run and have to pick a partner from the mostly non-cooperative lot 
they find in the pool. 
Generalizing this finding, Schüßler relates his model to one of  the 
“central, classical assumptions of  normativistic sociology” which 
implies “that in an exchange society of  rational egoists no stable 
cooperation-relations can emerge” (Schüßler 1997, 91). Schüssler 
ascribes this assumption to the sociologists Émile Durkheim and 
Talcott Parsons. Without quoting any sources Schüßler furthermore 
maintains that “alleged proofs for this thesis attempt to show that 
already simple analytical reflections suffice for this conclusion.” And he 
believes his simulation “to be fit to shake this evidence”.14 But even if  
                                                 
14 This is my translation. The German original reads: “Eine der zentralen, 
klassischen Annahmen der normativistischen Soziologie besagt, daß in einer 
Austauschgesellschaft rationaler Egoisten keine stabilen Kooperationsverhältnisse 
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Parsons or Durkheim did indeed believe that “simple analytical 
reflections” suffice to back this assumption (rather than relying on their 
own empirical work to back it), it is most likely that they would embed 
their argument in a theoretical framework where the “inability to 
emerge stable cooperation-relations” is not proven of  rational egoists in 
the sense of  rational choice theory or of  agents in the highly stylized 
environment of  a computer simulation but of  humans with their 
distinct psychological signature. A normativistic sociologist does not at 
all need to deny that the emergence of  stable cooperation-relations is 
possible among the artificial agents in a highly stylized simulation 
model in order to still maintain that it is impossible in the real world 
given the human nature as we know it and are acquainted with it. 
Thus, far from being “fit to shake this evidence” Schüßler’s simulation 
does in fact not allow him to make any substantial contribution to the 
discussion about normativistic sociology. Incidentally, the example 
highlights the difference between logical and real possibilities and it 
shows how notoriously weak proofs of  logical possibilities usually are in 
the social sciences. 
 
5.4.  Skyrms’ take on Game Theory and Social Contract Philosophy 
 
Brian Skyrms (1996; 2004) has written two books that present game 
theoretical models and vaguely relate them to social contract 
philosophy. What I am concerned with here is not his models that may 
have their merits on their own right,15 but the background story that he 
sells them with. In “The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of  Social 
Structure” (2004) he writes: 
 
How do we get from the hunt hare equilibrium to the stag hunt 
equilibrium? We could approach the problem in two different 
                                                                                                                                             
entstehen können (vgl. Durkheim 1997, Parsons 1949). Angebliche Nachweise für 
diese These versuchen zu zeigen, daß bereits einfache, analystische Überlegungen zu 
diesem Schluß ausreichen. Die vorliegende Simulation sollte geeignet sein, diese 
Sicherheit zu erschüttern.” (Schüßler 1997, 91). 
15 For the discussion of  these see Ernst (2001) and Batterman et al. (1998). Both of  
these papers are, of  course, only concerned with Skyrms first book (1996) only. 
While both papers take critical notice of  the lack of  robustness of  Skyrms’ 
simulations, they both give it a more gentle reading than I do here. 
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ways. We could follow Hobbes in asking the question in terms of  
rational self-interest. Or we could follow Hume by asking the 
question in a dynamic setting. We can ask these questions using 
modern tools – which are more than Hobbes and Hume had 
available, but still less than we need for fully adequate answers. 
(Skyrms 2004, 10) 
 
Skyrms uses game theoretical simulation models to explore these 
questions. And he suggests that these “modern tools” allow us to gain 
insights about the topics that Hobbes and Hume explored beyond that 
what Hobbes and Hume can offer us (“more than Hobbes and Hume 
had available”).16 Almost all of  the book is simply dedicated to the 
discussion of  various highly stylized simulation models. One of  the 
models Skyrm’s presents is a highly stylized spatial model of  the stag 
hunt game. I am not going to discuss this model in detail. Only so 
much: Depending on the setup and the particular boundary conditions 
the cooperative stag hunting equilibrium spreads and eventually 
replaces the non cooperative hare hunting equilibrium completely. In a 
concluding postscript Skyrms returns to the topic of  classical social 
contract philosophy: 
 
How much progress have we made in addressing the fundamental 
question of  the social contract: “How can you get from the non 
cooperative hare hunting equilibrium to the cooperative stag 
hunting equilibrium?” The outlines of  a general answer have 
begun to emerge. Over time there is some low level of  
experimentation with stag hunting. Eventually a small group of  
stag hunters comes to interact largely or exclusively with each 
other. ... The small group of  stag hunters prospers and can 
spread by reproduction and imitation. (Skyrms 2004, 123) 
 
                                                 
16 This echos a belief  in the superiority for formal methods that is widespread in 
contemporary analytical philosophy. In a similar vein Kwame Appiah writes “It 
would be interesting and important if  we could make more precise the sort of  
argument Hobbes offered, so that we could say just why it is that the advantages of  
civil society over the state of  nature ought to appeal to anyone.” (Appiah 2003, 
232) And he carries on  with describing the Prisoner’s Dilemma as game-theoretical 
model for the state of  nature. 
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The first oddity of  this story is that the reader has to assume that 
the fundamental question of  the social contract is a question about 
game theoretical equilibriums. Historically, the classical questions of  
the social contract that Hobes, Locke, Hume and others discussed in 
the 17th and 18th century, were questions like: How can we overcome or 
prevent anarchy? How is political order possible? Is a peaceful order 
without the institution of  government possible at all? How can we 
justify the institution of  government? And similar questions. Now, it is 
prima facie far from clear that these questions can be rephrased as the 
game theoretical question “How can you get from the non cooperative 
hare hunting equilibrium to the cooperative stag hunting equilibrium?” 
Rather it seems that, just like in Axelrod’s and Schüßler’s case, we have 
a highly stylized computer model on the one hand side and we have 
concrete real life questions on the other hand side and the resemblance 
between both is at best metaphorical. 
However, if  it is assumed that the “fundamental question of  the 
social contract” when rephrased in game theoretical terms really is the 
same question, then the second oddity is the fact that the answer that 
Skyrms arrives at contradicts completely the answer that Hobbes, 
Locke, Hume and about any other classical social contract philosopher 
arrived at. In Skyrms model it is possible that order (resembled by the 
cooperative hare hunting equilibrium) emerges from disorder 
(resembled by the non cooperative stag hunting equilibrium) even 
without the institution of  government. But the whole point of  classical 
social contract philosophy was to justify the existence of  government 
(and to determine its proper form), because none of  the social contract 
philosophers from the 17th and 18th centuries seriously believed that a 
peaceful order was possible without government. It is surprising that 
Skyrms does not comment on this contradiction. If  we exclude the 
possibility that the thinkers of  the 17th and 18th century were simply 
wrong (which for the extreme scarcity of  historical examples of  
peaceful states of  anarchy we can safely do), then the most benevolent 
reading we can give to Skyrms is that under the guise of  social contract 
theory he discusses different questions with the help of  game 
theoretical models that may be appropriate to address these, but which 
appear inadequate when related to the classical questions of  social 
contract theory that circle around the institution of  government in 
large scale societies.  
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5.5.  Arnold and the story of  “slip stream” altruism 
 
I have myself  conducted some Axelrod-style simulations and published 
the results in Arnold (2008). Do they suffer from the same limitations 
as the other examples? I am afraid they do and here is why. 
In Arnold (2008) I conduct large scale simulation series of  Axelrod-
style simulation of  the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Then I analyze 
the results, both the aggregated results and some of  the individual 
simulation results. In these I found “interesting” phenomena that I 
then examined thoroughly and tried to explain in the sense in which 
one “explains” the results of  computer simulations, i.e. by relating 
them to the mechanisms of  the simulation and trying to understand 
why these mechanisms bring the results about. What I refrained from 
doing is to draw general conclusions from the simulations, but, as has 
been said earlier, such modesty does not rescue the project, because it 
only  raises the question what a simulation is good for, if  no conclusions 
can be drawn from it. 
One of  these interesting phenomena, is the fact that in many 
simulations of  the series naïve cooperators gained a moderate success. 
In mixed strategy sets that contain reciprocators (e.g. TIT FOR TAT), 
naïve cooperators (e.g. DOVE) and exploiting strategies (e.g. HAWK) it 
can happen that the reciprocators wipe out the exploiters before the 
naïve cooperators have been wiped out, which allows the naïve 
cooperators to survive at a low level. I called this phenomenon “slip 
stream”-altruism (Arnold 2008, 103ff.). Its philosophical significance, 
if  any, lies in the fact that it shows that under evolutionary conditions 
even genuine altruists, i.e. altruists that do good without expecting to 
be treated well in return, can survive.17 Some philosophers tend to 
interpret reciprocal altruism as merely a kind of  time-deferred egoism. 
(It should be observed that punishment isn’t costly in this model, so the 
naïve cooperators do not live at the expense of  the reciprocal 
cooperators.) 
An interesting special case is that where naïve cooperators are even 
more successful than reciprocal cooperators. This case is in its simplest 
                                                 
17 Another evolutionary mechanism that can produce genuine altruists is that of  
group selection (Sober and Wilson 1998). 
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form depicted on figure 3. Here the strategies TAT FOR TAT (a variant 
of  TIT FOR TAT that starts with a defection) and TIT FOR TAT keep 
out the exploiter HAWK. But since TIT FOR TAT and TAT FOR TIT 
do not play very well against each other, DOVE earns the highest score. 
I used the term conflicting reciprocators to describe the situation when 
there are different types of  reciprocal altruists in the game that do not 
play well with each other. 
But can we learn anything about reality from this finding? It is 
imaginable that a biologist eventually stumbles upon a constellation of  
behavioral types in the population of  some animal species that contains 
exploitative, naïve and reciprocal strategies and where the naïve 
altruistic behavioral types enjoy the highest population share. Then, 
this simulation might serve as one of  (undoubtedly) several possible 
explanatory metaphors for this behavior. It is not more than a 
metaphor because, again, we cannot measure the payoff  parameters. 
The simulation depicted on figure 3 yields TIT FOR TAT instead of  
DOVE as the winner if  the payoff  parameter R is set back to its 
default value R = 3. Therefore, I believe that at the end of  the day my 
simulation series is just another one of  the “toy models with limited 
applicability” that Hammerstein (2003, 92) complains about.18 
                                                 
18 Some of  my simulations are quoted favorably in Schurz (2012). Now, I am very 
grateful for that and happy that the simulations were useful to someone else. 
However, in view of  the epistemological limitations of  purely theoretical 
simulations such as mine, I still feel a bit uneasy about it as if  with some kind of  
undeserved praise. 
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Figure 3: DOVE wins because there are conflicting reciprocal 
cooperators in the game. (Please note that the parameter R = 4 in this 
simulation!) 
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